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DISPOSITIONAL LOGIC AND COMMONSENSE REASONING
Abstract
Di sposi t ional logic (DL) is a branch of fuzzy logic which is concerned with
inference from dispositions, or propositions, which are preponderantly, but
not necessarily, true. Simple examples of dispositions are: birds can fly,
snow is white, and Swedes are blonde. The importance of the concept of a
disposition derives from the fact that much of "ommonsense knowledge may be
viewed as a collection of dispositions. Di spos; t ional logic provides an
alternative approach to the theories of default reasoning, nonmonotonic
reasoning, circumscription, and other widely-used approaches to commonsense
reasoning. The premises in DL are assumed to be of the form usually (X is
A) or usually (Y is B if X is A), where A and B are fuzzy predicates which
play the role of elastic constraints on the variables X and Y. Inference
from such premises reduces, in general, to the solution of a nonlinear
program. In many cases, an inference rule in DL has the form of a fuzzy
syllogism. The importance of di sposi t ional logic transcends its function as
a basis for formal izat ion of commonsense reasoning. Viewed in a broader
perspective, it underlies the remarkable human a b i l i t y to make rational
decisions in an environment of uncertainty and imprecision.
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